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This essay was published as the guest editor’s introduction to the summer 2012 special 
issue of Cityscape, devoted to the Moving to Opportunity experiment. Support for the 
long-term follow-up of MTO families was provided by a contract from the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD; C-CHI-00808) and grants from 
National Science Foundation (SES-0527615), the National Institute for Child Health and 
Human Development (R01-HD040404, R01-HD040444), the Centers for Disease Control 
(R49-CE000906), the National Institute of Mental Health (R01-MH077026), the National 
Institute for Aging (P20-AG012180, R56-AG031259, and P01-AG005842-22S1), the 
National Opinion Research Center’s Population Research Center (through R24-
HD051152-04 from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development), 
University of Chicago’s Center for Health Administration Studies, the U.S. Department 
of Education/Institute of Education Sciences (R305U070006), the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Russell Sage 
Foundation, the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Spencer Foundation, and the Annie E. 
Casey Foundation. The writing of this essay was also supported by a visiting scholar 
award from the Russell Sage Foundation, and an Investigator Award in Health Policy 
Research from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. Outstanding assistance with the 
data preparation and analysis was provided by Joe Amick, Ryan Gillette, Ijun Lai, Jordan 
Marvakov, Nicholas Potter, Matt Sciandra, Fanghua Yang, Sabrina Yusuf, and Michael 
Zabek. The survey data collection effort was led by Nancy Gebler of the University of 
Michigan’s Survey Research Center under subcontract to our research team. This 
introduction is based in large part on a series of conversations that I have had over the 
years with my collaborators on the long-term MTO study – the principal investigator for 
NBER’s long-term study of MTO, Lawrence Katz, and the other members of the research 
team: Emma Adam, William Congdon, Greg Duncan, Lisa Gennetian, Ronald Kessler, 
Jeffrey Kling, Stacy Lindau, Thomas McDade, and Robert Whitaker. Thanks to Patrick 
Sharkey for helpful discussions and to Mark Shroder for his assistance in assembling this 
special issue of Cityscape. Any errors and all opinions are my own and do not reflect the 
views of HUD.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Residential segregation of America’s neighborhoods by income has been increasing over 
the past 40 years, with nearly 9 million people now living in census tracts with poverty 
rates of 40 percent or more (Watson, 2009, Kneebone, Nadeau, and Berube, 2011). 
Because housing policy affects the geographic concentration of poverty in a variety of 
ways, policymakers have long been concerned about the possibility that living in a 
distressed neighborhood could have some harmful effects on the life outcomes of adults 
and children. The list of plausible reasons why neighborhood poverty might adversely 
affect people’s well-being and behavior is long and includes limited exposure to peers 
and role models who support pro-social behaviors such as schooling and work, neighbors 
who are willing and able to cooperate and work together to improve community life, 
high-quality local public institutions such as schools, police, health care and housing, and 
elevated exposure to risk factors like pollution or crime.1
 
 
Empirically isolating the independent effects of neighborhood environments on the life 
outcomes of residents turns out to be quite challenging in practice, because most people 
have at least some degree of choice over where they live. A large body of research going 
back to the 17th century shows that people who live in relatively more distressed 
neighborhoods tend to have worse life outcomes than do those people living in less 
disadvantaged areas, even after statistically adjusting for characteristics of the individuals 
themselves and their families. What remains unclear is the degree to which these patterns 
reflect true “neighborhood effects,” or instead reflect the influence of hard-to-measure 
characteristics of people that lead them to wind up living in different types of 
neighborhoods – or what social scientists call “selection bias.” 
 
To overcome concerns with selection bias and help isolate neighborhood effects on low-
income families, in the early 1990s the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) launched one of the most ambitious social experiments ever carried 
out by the agency – the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) demonstration. Via random 
lottery, MTO offered some public housing families but not others the chance to use a 
housing voucher to move from high- to lower-poverty neighborhoods. Some of the 
families that were offered the chance to relocate were offered special vouchers that could 
initially only be used to move into very low-poverty areas, although after one year 
families could use the vouchers to move again (including to higher-poverty places). 
 
This special issue of Cityscape focuses on the long-term follow-up that measured 
outcomes of MTO families 10-15 years after random assignment carried out by a 
research team assembled by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), which 
was supported by a contract with HUD and additional grants from other agencies and 
private foundations. In this guest editor’s introduction I provide some basic background 
                                                 
1 For excellent reviews of the theoretical and empirical literatures on “neighborhood effects” see Jencks 
and Mayer (1991), Ellen and Turner (1997), Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn (2000), Sampson, Morenoff and 
Gannon-Rowley (2002), and Kawachi and Berkman (2003). 
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about MTO that frames all of the paper’s that follow, and offer some thoughts of my own 
about what lessons we might take from MTO for both social science and public policy. 
 
In Section 2, I briefly review the motivation for the MTO demonstration and the specifics 
of its design. A more detailed discussion of MTO’s rationale and design is in the essay in 
this symposium by Mark Shroder and Larry Orr. The symposium paper by Jennifer 
Comey, Susan Popkin and Kaitlin Franks shows that MTO was successful in helping 
families move into higher-quality housing units. The commentary by Edgar Olsen in this 
symposium notes that the cost to taxpayers of providing higher-quality housing units to 
MTO voucher-holders might actually be zero or negative, in the sense that previous 
research suggests that the cost of providing a given level of housing quality might be 
lower with vouchers than public housing. But Olsen notes that there would be great value 
in exploiting the MTO platform to learn more about these cost-effectiveness issues.  
 
In Section 2 I also show that MTO was successful in getting families to move initially 
into very low-poverty areas. One year after randomization, the difference in tract poverty 
rates between the control group and those who were offered housing vouchers to move 
into low-poverty areas was about 35 percentage points, or fully 2.8 standard deviations in 
the nationwide census-tract-poverty-rate distribution. Previous housing mobility 
programs have found that families initially relocated into low-poverty areas tend to 
“stick” (Keels et al., 2005). An open empirical question is whether the same would be 
true for MTO families. 
 
In Section 3 I review the evidence showing that the very large initial differences in 
average neighborhood conditions between the MTO treatment and control groups 
narrowed over time. This convergence is commonly attributed to the tendency of families 
who move with MTO vouchers to make additional moves back to higher-poverty areas, 
and has led to calls for the government to provide additional supports to voucher 
recipients to help them stay in low-poverty areas once they’ve moved there. I show that, 
somewhat surprisingly, most of the convergence over time between MTO treatment and 
control groups in neighborhood poverty rates is actually due to improvements over time 
in the neighborhoods of the control group.  
 
In Section 4 I consider the key question of whether MTO generates enough sustained 
variation in neighborhood conditions to provide a useful test of the “neighborhood 
effects” hypothesis. When we look across the entire 10-15 year follow-up study period 
moving with a MTO voucher reduces average census tract poverty rates by about 18 
percentage points, equal to nearly half of the control group’s average tract poverty rate of 
40 percent. This is about as much variation in neighborhood poverty as we see in studies 
of African-American families in leading observational datasets like the Project on Human 
Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN). MTO generates less change in racial 
segregation, although as Mark Shroder and Larry Orr discuss in their essay, much of the 
discussion leading up MTO was about neighborhood-effect theories that emphasized 
adverse effects from economic segregation more so than from racial segregation. 
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MTO also had large, sustained impacts on more subtle neighborhood attributes that are 
not readily measured with existing administrative data sources, such as social networks 
and neighborhood social processes and safety, and that require original in-person data 
collection from the MTO participants to measure. Since families were followed up over 
such a long time (10-15 years), and because low-income families tend to be very 
residentially mobile and hence difficult to track, no one would have been surprised if the 
long-term surveys had low response rates. And yet as Nancy Gebler and her co-authors 
note in their paper in this symposium, the team from the University of Michigan tasked 
with carrying out the surveys achieved remarkably high response rates, 90% for adults 
and 89% for youth, very similar across groups, to preserve the key strength of MTO’s 
experimental design. Gebler et al.’s chapter includes some useful lessons for future 
researchers about how to track similar populations, and presents some interesting results 
about what we would have found in the MTO data had we run out of time and money and 
been forced to stop the data collection at a lower response rate. 
 
The chapters in this symposium by Lisa Sanbonmatsu and co-authors and by Lisa 
Gennetian and co-authors summarize the mixed pattern of impacts that MTO had on the 
outcomes of adults and youth over the long-term. In Section 5 of my introduction I offer 
my own thoughts about what these results mean for social science hypotheses about 
neighborhood effects on adults and children. The MTO findings reject the hypothesis that 
“neighborhoods always matter,” since we did not find detectable effects on schooling or 
labor market outcomes across the five demonstration sites in either the interim (4-7 year) 
or long-term (10-15 year) follow-up studies. Because MTO enrolled a very disadvantaged 
set of families living in severely distressed areas, these findings may not generalize to 
less disadvantaged samples and settings. But these are exactly the sorts of disadvantaged 
families that have commanded (for good reason) a disproportionate share of media and 
policy attention, and there is little in the existing research literature that would have 
predicted that the most disadvantaged families should be less affected by their 
neighborhood environments than are other types of families. MTO teaches us that 
neighborhood effects are more contingent than we had thought. 
 
The fact that MTO moves had impacts on a several important outcome domains – 
physical and mental health – that are to my way of thinking quite large in size also lets us 
reject the overly-sweeping conclusion that “neighborhoods don’t matter.” What remains 
something of a puzzle is why neighborhood environments seem to matter much more for 
health than for other outcomes. In Section 5 I speculate about some answers to this 
question, which are motivated by some suggestive evidence that changes in neighborhood 
safety could be one of the key mechanisms of action behind MTO’s impacts on health 
outcomes. 
 
In Section 6 I consider the implications of MTO for public policy. Many people have 
concluded that mobility programs that are more intensive than MTO in terms of 
achieving changes in neighborhood or school environments of families may be necessary 
to change those outcome domains like schooling and employment that were not affected 
by MTO. This is, for example, the spirit of the comments in this symposium by Philip 
Oreopolous, Margery Turner, and Kathy Edin and colleagues. But my own reading of 
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MTO and other research suggests this need not be the case. I also consider what we might 
learn from MTO about the design of community-level interventions, with a focus on 
safety given the role this might play in driving the MTO impacts on health and the 
importance of safety to the MTO families themselves. 
 
II. The Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment 
 
The MTO story begins in 1966 on the south side of Chicago, actually not very far at all 
from my office at the University of Chicago. The first quasi-experimental evidence to 
support the idea that neighborhoods may exert large effects on poor families arose from a 
discrimination lawsuit against the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) filed on behalf of a 
black public housing resident named Dorothy Gautreaux (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum, 
2000). As a result, starting in the 1970s a total of 7,100 families were moved into 
different parts of Chicago that were poor and segregated, but improving, while others 
were relocated into low-poverty, racially integrated suburbs (Keels et al., 2005). 
 
A 1988 follow-up survey carried out by Northwestern University sociologist James 
Rosenbaum found that moving to the suburbs instead of other parts of Chicago was 
associated with better job outcomes for mothers and schooling outcomes for children 
(Rosenbaum, 1995, Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum, 2000). Rosenbaum’s findings were 
interesting and provocative, but left open the question of whether at least part of the 
difference in outcomes between Gautreaux suburban versus city movers might not be due 
to other differences in the characteristics of the families themselves. Follow-up research 
has provided some support for this concern and has tended to find smaller impacts on 
family outcomes (Mendenhall, Duncan and Deluca, 2006, Votruba and Kling, 2009, 
Deluca et al., 2010). 
 
The initial Gautreaux findings were nonetheless important enough to motivate HUD to 
sponsor the first true randomized experimental test of what happens to families when 
they move into very different neighborhood environments – the Moving to Opportunity 
(MTO) demonstration. Eligibility for MTO was limited to low-income families with 
children living in selected distressed public housing or project-based housing in five 
cities: Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. The housing projects 
from which MTO families came were among the most distressed in the country, with an 
average tract poverty rate of fully 53 percent. These projects were also extremely racially 
segregated. Almost all of the MTO participants from the Baltimore and Chicago sites are 
African-American, while the other three sites are split about evenly between blacks and 
Hispanics. There were very few white families in these housing projects, and as a result 
there are very few whites in the MTO study sample. 
 
Between 1994 and 1998, MTO enrolled a total of 4,604 families. Surveys collected at 
baseline (Table 1) show just how disadvantaged these families were when they signed up 
for the MTO program. The average annual household income was $12,827 (in 2009 
dollars). Fewer than two of five MTO household heads had a high school diploma, while 
three-quarters were on welfare. 
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Perhaps the most striking result from Table 1 is that over 40 percent of MTO applicants 
had someone in the household victimized by a crime during the six months before the 
baseline survey. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that far and away the most important 
reason families signed up for MTO was safety. Three-quarters of MTO applicants said 
getting away from gangs and drugs was the first or second most important reason they 
signed up for MTO. 
 
The families that volunteered for MTO were then randomly assigned them to one of the 
following three conditions: 
 
? The Experimental group was offered the chance to use a housing rent-subsidy 
voucher2 to move into private-market housing in lower-poverty areas. As part of 
the MTO design, the vouchers offered to families in this group could only be 
redeemed in census tracts with a 1990 poverty rate under 10 percent. Families had 
to stay in these neighborhoods for one year. If they moved before the year was up, 
they would lose their voucher. But after their initial one-year lease was up they 
could use their housing voucher to move again, including moves into a higher-
poverty area. Families in this group also received housing search assistance and 
relocation counseling from local non-profit organizations.3
? The traditional Section 8 voucher group was offered a regular housing voucher to 
move into private-market housing, with no special MTO-imposed constraints on 
where they move. Families in this group also did not receive any special housing 
mobility counseling beyond what is normally provided to voucher-holders. 
 
? The control group did not receive access to any new services through MTO, but 
did not lose access to any housing or other social services to which they would 
otherwise have been entitled. 
 
Random assignment in MTO helps overcome the self-selection concerns with previous 
observational (non-experimental) studies by creating groups of families who are 
comparable in all respects but differ in the housing and neighborhood conditions that they 
experience. As a result, any differences across groups in their average outcomes can be 
attributed to the MTO mobility intervention itself. 
 
Not all of the families who were offered a MTO housing voucher used them. Around 47 
percent of those families offered an Experimental group voucher and 63 percent of those 
offered a Section 8-group voucher relocated through MTO. While many people outside 
                                                 
2 Housing vouchers provide families with a subsidy for their private-market rent, equal to the difference 
between the local-area Fair Market Rent (set to equal between the 40th and 50th percentile of the local 
metropolitan area’s rent distribution, depending on the city and year in question) and 30 percent of the 
family’s adjusted income (see Olsen, 2003 and Jacob and Ludwig, 2012 for details). The family’s required 
rent contribution is the same for public housing and housing vouchers and so receipt of a voucher does not 
free-up any extra disposable income to families by enabling them to change their own out-of-pocket 
spending on rent. 
3 The interim and long-term HUD technical reports summarizing the MTO results (Orr et al., 2003, and 
Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011) describe the three groups as experimental, Section 8, and controls. In some of 
our research team’s other writings (for example, Ludwig et al., 2011) we use instead the more descriptive 
terms “low-poverty voucher group,” “traditional voucher group,” and controls. 
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the housing-policy research community have been surprised by these take-up rates, these 
figures are generally similar to what has been found in previous studies of other housing 
voucher programs (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum, 2000, Olsen, 2003). One reason some 
families do not move is because they cannot find a unit that is affordable under the 
voucher program rules, within the time limit that the voucher program allows families to 
search for housing. The difficulty of finding affordable housing in the allowable time 
may have been particularly challenging for families in the Experimental group, who were 
restricted to looking in low-poverty census tracts. Some families in the Experimental 
group did not relocate because they did not attend all of the life-skills counseling sessions 
that the local non-profit organizations assisting with the housing search required them to 
complete before looking for housing. It is worth keeping in mind that many of the 
proposals that have been raised to increase voucher take-up rates may create some 
difficult tradeoffs for policymakers.4
 
 
The fact that only some of the families who are offered MTO housing vouchers actually 
use them does not introduce any selection bias into our analyses (for additional 
discussion see Ludwig et al., 2008). Families who are assigned to a voucher group who 
use a voucher are surely different from those who don’t. The analyses presented in this 
Cityscape issue show two types of estimates: (1) the effect of being offered a housing 
voucher through MTO, known as the “intention to treat” (or ITT) effect and calculated as 
the difference in average outcomes of all families assigned to one of the treatment groups 
with all families assigned to control; or (2) the effect of actually moving with a housing 
voucher in MTO, known as the “effect of treatment on the treated” (or TOT) which is 
calculated using a method that preserves the strength of the MTO experimental design.5
 
 
It is also important to keep in mind when reading the MTO findings that the control 
condition in the MTO demonstration does not correspond to a situation of “no mobility.” 
Families in the MTO control group were allowed to move on their own, even if they did 
                                                 
4 For example, one potential way to improve voucher take-up rates is to provide families with a longer 
window of time to search for units. But this creates the risk of reducing the share of vouchers that are being 
used by low-income families at any given point in time. Alternatively we could spend more money on 
housing-mobility counseling assistance for voucher recipients, or efforts to encourage landlords to accept 
housing vouchers. But even if these efforts were successful in increasing voucher lease-up rates, spending 
more on these types of activities necessarily comes at the cost of diverting money that could have gone to 
providing actual housing subsidies to the two-thirds of income-eligible households in America who are not 
enrolled in means-tested housing programs (Olsen, 2003).  
5 We do not try to estimate the effects of moving with a MTO voucher by doing something non-
experimental such as comparing just the Experimental group movers with the controls, because the families 
in the Experimental group who move with a voucher are a self-selected subset of families assigned into that 
group – and so this self-selected subset cannot be compared with all the families assigned to the control 
group, because this would be an apples-to-oranges comparison. Instead, we estimate the TOT in a way that 
exploits the experimental design of MTO, as follows. If we are willing to assume that being assigned to the 
Experimental (or Section 8-only) group does not have much effect on families who do not use a MTO 
voucher to move, then the TOT effect will equal the ITT effect divided by the share of families assigned to 
the Experimental (or Section 8-only) group who use a MTO voucher to relocate (H. Bloom, 1984). Since 
no control group families can use a MTO voucher by construction, the TOT estimate for some outcome of 
interest is basically the ratio of two ITT effects that are fully experimental – the ITT effect on the outcome 
divided by the ITT effect on use of a MTO voucher.  
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not receive any assistance through MTO to move. In addition, many of the public housing 
projects in which MTO families were living at baseline were demolished through HUD’s 
HOPE VI and other programs (see for example Katz, 2009), which further contributed to 
control-group mobility. 
 
Finally, we should be clear about what policy questions MTO can and cannot answer. 
MTO compares the effects of being offered a housing voucher with the chance to stay in 
public housing, which leads to sizable changes in neighborhood conditions (as I describe 
below) but no change in out-of-pocket household spending on rent. This comparison 
helps answer the policy question of what would happen if we changed the mix of means-
tested housing programs to include a larger share of housing vouchers and a smaller share 
of project-based units. MTO does not tell us anything about the effects of giving housing 
vouchers to people who are living unsubsidized in the private housing market, which 
leads to large gains in disposable income from families because they can now spend 
much less out-of-pocket on rent, but generates relatively little change in neighborhood 
conditions (see Mills et al., 2006, Jacob and Ludwig, 2012). The comparison of vouchers 
to living in the private housing market without a subsidy is relevant for the policy 
question of what happens when we expand the share of families receiving means-tested 
subsidies, which is important in its own right given that not less than a third of income-
eligible families are in means-tested housing programs (Olsen, 2003). 
 
III. MTO’s effects on neighborhood conditions 
 
The logic model behind MTO is that assignment to the Experimental or Section 8-group 
leads families to change their living conditions, which in turn leads to changes in their 
behavior and well-being. For there to be any value at all in looking at MTO impacts on 
behavioral outcomes we need to first establish that the MTO demonstration did actually 
change the environments in which families were living. So that the papers in this 
Cityscape issue do not have to replicate this material over and over, I summarize MTO’s 
impacts on neighborhood conditions of participating families here. MTO also changed 
the housing conditions of families as well, which are carefully presented and discussed in 
the paper in this symposium by Jennifer Comey, Susan Popkin and Kaitlin Franks. 
 
Table 2 shows that one year after the time of random assignment, even the intention-to-
treat (ITT) effects of MTO on neighborhood conditions were very large, despite the fact 
that many families who were offered MTO vouchers did not use them. The ITT estimates 
in Table 2 show that one year after baseline, families assigned to the Experimental or 
Section 8 voucher groups were living in census tracts with poverty rates that were 17 and 
14 percentage points lower than the average census tract of the control group, which was 
50 percent poor. (In what follows I will tend to focus on the Experimental group versus 
Control group contrast, which winds up providing the strongest test of “neighborhood 
effects,” although the contrast between the Section 8-group and Control group is also of 
interest for what it can tell us about providing vouchers to public housing families and 
other key housing-policy questions about the right mix of housing program services). 
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Over time MTO’s effects on neighborhood poverty rates diminishes. Table 2 shows that 
the ITT effect on census tract poverty rates from being assigned to the Experimental 
rather than control group was 10 percentage points measured five years after baseline, 
and about 5 percentage points measured 10-12 years after baseline. 
 
What has not been widely appreciated is that most of this convergence in neighborhood 
conditions across randomized MTO groups is caused by improvements over time in the 
neighborhoods of control group families, rather than by subsequent mobility (or 
“secondary moves”) by the Experimental or Section 8-only group families. The average 
census tract poverty rates for families assigned to the Experimental group declined over 
the period from 1 to 10-12 years after baseline by 5 percentage points (from around 33 to 
28 percent). The convergence in tract poverty rates between the Experimental and control 
groups occurs because the control group experienced an even larger decline in tract 
poverty rates over this period, equal to fully 17 percentage points (from 50 to 33 percent).  
 
Regardless of the cause, it is clearly true that the neighborhood conditions of the MTO 
treatment and control groups became more similar over time. Rather than look at MTO’s 
impacts on tract poverty rates at a particular point in time, we can also average over the 
entire follow-up study period. Looking at MTO’s effects on average neighborhood 
conditions that families experience over the entire follow-up study period also fits with 
the common view that behavioral change may require accumulated exposure to 
neighborhood environments (see for example Clampet-Lundquist and Massey, 2008). 
Table 2 presents results that average the neighborhood conditions over all of the different 
addresses families report during the study period, giving more weight to those addresses 
in which people spent relatively more time. Over the course of the study period the 
average control group family lived in a census tract that was 40 percent poor, compared 
to an average tract poverty rate for families assigned to the Experimental group equal to 
31 percent, for an ITT effect of 9 percentage points. 
 
I have intentionally focused so far on the ITT effects of MTO on neighborhood 
environments to make it easier to see how much the changes over time in the control 
group neighborhoods is contributing to the convergence in neighborhood conditions 
between the Experimental and control groups. But as mentioned above, it is also possible 
to calculate the effects of MTO on the neighborhood conditions of those who actually 
move through the program, or the effects of treatment on the treated (TOT). Table 2 
shows the TOT effect on duration-weighted tract poverty rates was fully 18 percentage 
points, equal to about 45 percent of the control group’s average tract poverty rate over the 
study period of 40 percent. 
 
Table 2 also shows that MTO had large impacts on an index of neighborhood 
disadvantage that Sampson, Sharkey and Raudenbush (2008) argue may provide a better 
measure of the extent of neighborhood conditions compared to just looking at poverty 
alone. The index is a weighted average of census tract share poor, unemployed, share of 
households headed by a single parent, share receiving welfare, and share of the tract 
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population that is under age 18.6
 
 The logic behind this index is that some neighborhoods 
are low-income because they are comprised of two-parent families that are mostly 
working but have low earnings, while other neighborhoods are poor because have a large 
share of single-parent households that are disconnected from the formal labor force. 
These two types of neighborhoods may have similar poverty rates but the social 
conditions in these two types of places will be quite different, which will be reflected in 
different values of the concentrated disadvantage index. Table 2 shows that the average 
duration-weighted tract disadvantage level of the control group in MTO over our study 
period was about 1.39. Those who move with an Experimental group voucher experience 
a decline of -.49 on this index, equal to around 35 percent of the control mean. 
While MTO focused explicitly on reducing economic rather than racial segregation for 
participating families, one might have expected there to be important changes in 
neighborhood racial segregation as a byproduct of the MTO moves given that residents of 
high-poverty neighborhoods are very disproportionately likely to be Hispanic or African-
American (Jargowsky, 1997, 2003). Yet as Table 2 makes clear, MTO’s impacts on racial 
segregation for participants were modest. The average control group family spent the 
study period in a census tract that was 88 percent minority. The tract share minority for 
those who moved with an Experimental was lower by a statistically significant amount, 
but the TOT effect of about 13 percent means that over the study period even the 
Experimental group movers were living in census tracts in which fully three-quarters of 
all residents were members of racial and ethnic minority groups. 
 
Despite the lack of major MTO impact on neighborhood racial composition, MTO moves 
led to sizable changes in neighborhood social processes that a growing body of 
sociological research suggests might be particularly important in affecting people’s life 
outcomes (Sampson, Morenoff and Gannon-Rowley, 2002). Note that Table 2 focuses on 
the self-reports of MTO adults about their social networks and neighborhood social 
processes measured 10-12 years after random assignment – that is, after the convergence 
in neighborhood poverty rates between treatment and control groups has occurred. 
 
Table 2 shows that 10-12 years after baseline, the Experimental group TOT effect on the 
likelihood of having at least one college-educated friend was nearly 15 percentage points, 
or about one-third of the control mean of 53 percent. The Experimental TOT effect on the 
likelihood that neighbors would do something if local youth were spraying graffiti (what 
Sampson, Earls and Raudenbush, 1997 call “collective efficacy”) was over 15 percentage 
points, about one-quarter of the control group’s value of 59 percent. 
 
                                                 
6 While Sampson, Sharkey and Raudenbush (2008) calculate the index using share African-American as an 
additional component, we discuss MTO impacts on tract minority share separately and so do not include 
that variable in our own calculation of the index. The weights we use in Table 2 are based on a principal 
components analysis that Sampson, Sharkey and Raudenbush (2008, Table 1) calculate using tract-level 
data for Chicago from the 2000 decennial census, and equal .90 for share tract receiving welfare, .88 for 
tract share poor, .86 for tract share unemployed, .87 for tract share households headed by female, and .73 
for tract share under age 18.  
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MTO also delivered in terms of changing the neighborhood condition that was the main 
reason most MTO families signed up for the program originally – safety. Moving with an 
Experimental group voucher reduces the local violent-crime rate (as measured by police 
data) by 876 violent crimes per 100,000 residents, equal to more than one-third the 
control group average of 2,420 violent crimes per 100,000. These administrative records 
might under-state MTO’s effects on safety because the geographic resolution of the local-
area crime data we can get from police departments varies greatly across cities, and is 
quite large in some places. Moreover only about half of all violent crimes nationwide are 
reported to police (Truman and Rand, 2011), and we might worry that reporting rates are 
even lower in distressed areas where people tend to distrust the police. Self-reported data 
about neighborhood safety from MTO participants shows similarly large effects. The 
Experimental TOT effect on the likelihood that adults report feeling unsafe in their 
neighborhood during the day equals 7 percentage points, over a third of the control 
group’s rate of 20 percent, and reduces the likelihood of having seen drugs used or sold 
in the neighborhood over the past month by 13 percentage points, over two-fifths of the 
control group value of 31 percent. 
 
IV. What can MTO tell us about “neighborhood effects”? 
 
If it had turned out that there were few differences in average neighborhood conditions 
between the treatment and control groups in MTO, then the MTO demonstration will not 
have much useful to say about the existence of any “neighborhood effects” on families. 
Yet in the previous section we showed that MTO moves generate changes in 
neighborhood disadvantage and social processes that are massive initially after random 
assignment. These effects are still sizable when averaged over the entire study period, 
viewed in absolute terms, or as a share of the control group average neighborhood 
attributes. So why do many people argue that MTO is a “weak treatment” that is of 
limited value for answering the social science question of whether and how neighborhood 
environments affect behavior? 
 
One concern that I think is legitimate is that some potentially important neighborhood 
attributes were not changed very much by MTO, and in particular neighborhood racial 
composition. But it is worth reiterating that many of the leading theories about why 
neighborhood environments might affect the well-being of residents focus on 
neighborhood attributes other than racial composition. For example the seminal work of 
William Julius Wilson (1987), which helped stimulate the sizable neighborhood-effects 
research literature that has developed over the past 25 years, focused on the consequences 
for low-income African-Americans from having middle-class blacks move out to other 
areas. This is a story about the importance of neighborhood socio-economic 
disadvantage, not racial segregation. 
 
Some people have expressed the view that MTO is a weak treatment even with respect to 
the sorts of socio-economic measures that I have argued in the pervious section were 
strongly affected. Why is that? One reason is a frequent tendency to focus exclusively on 
the ITT effect on neighborhood conditions, even though the TOT effect can also be 
identified from the experimental data so long as we are willing to assume that assignment 
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to a voucher group has little effect on those families who do not actually move with a 
voucher. Both types of estimates are of interest. ITT estimates are relevant for public 
policy because most housing-mobility programs in the real world would be voluntary, 
and so compliance will inevitably be less than perfect. The TOT estimates are also of 
interest because they help extrapolate MTO results to other mobility interventions that 
might have different voucher compliance rates, and are of scientific interest because they 
more directly identify the effects of location on people’s outcomes. 
 
A second reason MTO can look like a weak treatment is if one focuses on how far 
families change their rank in the national census tract poverty distribution. For example, 
Quigley and Raphael (2008, p. 22) note that the low-poverty voucher ITT effect moves 
families from the 96th percentile to the 88th percentile within the census tract poverty rate 
distribution for the five MTO cities. But this is a little misleading because as a share of all 
census tracts in the U.S. as a whole, there are just not all that many census tracts that have 
high tract poverty rates. This means that very large absolute changes in tract poverty rates 
can lead to relatively small changes in rank order at the top end of the distribution. 
 
A different way to think about how MTO changes people’s neighborhood “quality” 
within the larger neighborhood-quality distribution is to measure MTO’s impacts in 
standard deviation (sd) units. This metric essentially compares the size of the MTO 
impacts on census tract poverty rates to the amount of “spread” in the larger census-tract 
poverty-rate distribution. Table 2 shows that one year after random assignment, the 
Experimental group ITT effect is about -1.4 sd within the national tract distribution as 
measured in the 2000 decennial census data, while the TOT effect is equal to fully -2.8 
sd.7
 
 The Experimental group effects on duration-weighted average tract poverty rates 
averaged over the entire study period equal about -0.7 sd (ITT) and -1.5 sd (TOT). It is 
difficult to think of many social experiments that generate such large changes in 
important aspects of the living conditions of poor families. 
A third reason some observers conclude that MTO is a weak treatment is because they 
divide neighborhoods up into a small number of discrete and essentially arbitrary “types.” 
For example, Clampet-Lundquist and Massey (2008) create four neighborhood categories 
by dividing them on two separate dimensions: “poor” versus “non-poor” (whether the 
tract’s poverty rate is above or below 20 percent); and “segregated” versus “integrated” 
(whether the tract’s minority share is above or below 30 percent). Similarly, Turner et al. 
(2011) use threshold values of tract characteristics to define various categories of “high-
opportunity” neighborhoods, such as those with “high work and income” (tract poverty 
rates below 15 percent and employment rates above 60 percent) or “high education” (20 
percent or more of adults have a college degree). They conclude: “Although MTO 
enabled families to escape from the most severely distressed neighborhoods, very few 
actually gained and sustained access to high-opportunity neighborhoods” (p. 7).  
 
                                                 
7 Table 2 also shows results that standardize MTO’s impacts on tract poverty rates using the standard 
deviation of the control group’s tract poverty distribution, rather than the national tract poverty distribution 
found in the 2000 Census. 
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Defining “low-poverty” or “high-opportunity” neighborhoods on the basis of whether 
tract characteristics are above some threshold value makes sense if and only if we believe 
that neighborhoods only influence behavior once they reach some “quality” threshold. 
Put differently, dividing neighborhoods up into a small number of categories is sensible 
only if neighborhood effects on outcomes are non-linear, so that (say) moving from a 
tract that has a 50 percent to a 16 percent poverty rate has no effect on people’s outcomes 
(both of those neighborhood types would be “poor” under the Turner et al. definition), 
but moving from a neighborhood with a 16 percent poverty rate to a 15 percent poverty 
rate would have important impacts on outcomes (this would be a move from a “poor” to 
“non-poor” area in a Turner-type definition). 
 
Yet the evidence presented in Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) seems to suggest that a 1 
percentage point change in tract poverty rates has the same effect on people’s life 
outcomes regardless of whether we are going from 16 to 15 percent poor, or 26 to 25 
percent, or 36 to 35 percent, etc. If neighborhood effects on people’s outcomes are linear, 
as the findings by Kling et al. seem to suggest, then dividing up neighborhoods into a 
small number of categories winds up unhelpfully masking some of MTO’s impacts on the 
neighborhood conditions of participating families, by treating all neighborhoods with 
poverty rates above some threshold value as indistinguishable members of the same type 
of place (in Turner’s typology, going from 50 percent to 16 percent poor leaves one 
within the same neighborhood “type”). If neighborhood effects on outcomes are linear, 
then the most appropriate way to measure MTO impacts on neighborhoods is by 
reporting the impact on percentage point changes in the tract characteristics themselves – 
that is, looking at continuous measures. 
 
So is MTO too much of a “weak treatment” to be useful for social science purposes? Is 
there enough difference in average neighborhood conditions between the treatment and 
control groups to let us learn something about neighborhood effects? One benchmark we 
might use is to compare the amount of variation we see in neighborhood conditions in the 
MTO data to what we see in what is arguably the most important observational (non-
experimental) study of neighborhood effects ever carried out, the Project on Human 
Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN). Sampson, Sharkey and Raudenbush 
(2008) used the PHDCN to examine effects on verbal ability of African-American 
children from living in a census tract in the bottom quartile of Chicago’s distribution with 
respect to concentrated tract disadvantage (defined above), or the “treatment group” in 
their study, compared to all other African-Americans in their study, the “controls.” The 
treatment group in their study lived in tracts that were 38 percent poor, compared to 
control tracts that were 20 percent poor on average, for a difference of 18 percentage 
points – almost identical to what we see in MTO.8
 
 
V. What do the MTO results mean for social science? 
 
                                                 
8 If we look instead at Sampson et al.’s concentrated disadvantage index, defined without share African-
American included in the index, the treatment group in their study has an average value of 1.71 and 
controls have a value of 1.04, for a difference of .67. As shown in MTO, the control mean is 1.39 and the 
average value for those who move with an Experimental group voucher is 0.9, for a difference of 0.49.  
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Twenty-five years ago William Julius Wilson argued in the Truly Disadvantaged (1987) 
that a key reason why people living in high-poverty central-city neighborhoods tended to 
drop out of school or be out of the labor market was because of the harmful effects of the 
neighborhood environments in which they were living. The MTO data do not seem to 
support that hypothesis, at least for the sort of low-income, disadvantaged family that 
signed up for MTO.  
 
This raises the question of whether families as disadvantaged as those enrolling in MTO 
could have been expected to experience improved schooling and labor market outcomes 
from moving to less-distressed areas. Presumably the U.S. Congress and HUD thought 
so, since schooling and earnings were key outcomes mentioned as a focus of the 
demonstration. Previous observational studies like PHDCN have reported finding 
neighborhood effects on schooling outcomes for people about as disadvantaged as those 
in MTO.9
 
 And the sorts of very disadvantaged families that live in our nation’s most 
distressed public housing projects have, for understandable reasons, commanded a 
disproportionate share of the media and policy attention. While the MTO results might 
not generalize to families with higher levels of socio-economic status, knowing whether 
neighborhoods exert causal effects on key outcomes like schooling and work for very 
disadvantaged families is important in its own right for social science and public policy. 
Some people have concluded that MTO could have had bigger impacts on schooling 
outcomes if only the MTO moves generated larger changes in the characteristics of the 
schools that children attended (see also the comments in this issue by Margery Turner 
and Philip Oreopolous). Maybe. Previous studies suggest that attending a higher-quality 
urban school (public or charter) tends to have beneficial impacts on behavioral outcomes 
like schooling persistence or delinquency. But this is not as consistently true with respect 
to achievement test scores, which has for better or worse been an outcome of particular 
interest in policy discussions, and for which previous studies tend to find more mixed 
impacts (Cullen, Jacob and Levitt, 2006, Hastings, Kane and Staiger, 2006, 
Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2011, Angrist et al., 2010, 2011, Deming, 2012). How do we make 
sense of the fact that gaining access to a better school does not always lead to higher 
achievement test scores for all students?  
 
                                                 
9 For example Sampson, Sharkey and Raudenbush (2008) report statistically significant neighborhood 
effects on verbal test scores among African-American children in Chicago who were in the PHDCN study. 
As reported in the previous footnote, the average value of the concentrated disadvantage index for their 
high-poverty (“treatment”) group was 1.71, compared to an average value for the MTO high-poverty group 
(which we happen to call our “control group” instead) was 1.31 – or, put differently, their study sample is 
living in neighborhoods that are on average even more distressed than the average MTO family. 
Supplemental Table 6 for their paper reports on the mean values of their baseline covariates among all 
African-Americans in their study sample. Their study children are living in overwhelmingly (92 percent) 
female-headed households, just as in MTO. A slightly lower share of their PHDCN study sample is 
receiving welfare at baseline than in MTO (49 versus about 75 percent), but it is important to note that the 
baseline covariates they present are averaged across the entire set of African-American families in the 
PHDCN. If they reported baseline covariate values just for the families living in highly distressed 
neighborhoods their baseline covariates would almost surely be even closer to what we see in MTO. 
 (http://www.pnas.org/content/suppl/2007/12/12/0710189104.DC1/10189Table6.pdf).  
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One candidate explanation is that not all children experience a school the same way. As 
my University of Chicago colleague Stephen Raudenbush once said to me: “Dealing with 
heterogeneity across students in their academic needs is the challenge of education.” 
What a child gets out of attending a given school might all too often depend on where he 
or she falls within the school’s test-score distribution. Anyone who has ever taught will 
be familiar with the idea that teachers tend to target instruction towards the middle of a 
classroom’s achievement distribution. Some previous studies suggest teachers might even 
devote disproportionate attention to those students at the top of the distribution (B. 
Bloom, 1984). Children who are already far behind in school might not benefit much 
from attending a better school if that means that they experience a lot of instruction 
pitched above their heads. Common components to many successful educational 
interventions include a focus on extra instructional time for core reading and math skills, 
frequent assessments to gauge what students are learning, and targeted instruction 
through tutoring or small-group settings – something that regrettably few disadvantaged 
children seem to receive regardless of where they live and go to school.10
 
 
Just as MTO lets us rule out the strong claim that neighborhoods always matter, I spend a 
lot of my time talking to economists who make a claim that is equally strong in the other 
direction – that the real lesson from MTO is that neighborhood environments are just not 
that important for poor families. The fact that MTO moves generated changes in some 
important outcome domains, particularly mental and physical health, means that we can 
reject that view as well. What is particularly remarkable about the MTO health impacts is 
how massive they are. As Lisa Sanbonmatsu notes in her chapter, moving with a MTO 
Experimental-group voucher reduced rates of extreme obesity (BMI???????d diabetes 
(HbA1c????????????????????????40 percent expressed as a share of the control group’s 
prevalence rate. This is about as large as what we see from best-practice pharmaceutical 
treatment and public-health lifestyle interventions. Similarly, Kling, Liebman and Katz 
(2007) noted that MTO’s impacts on mental health outcomes in the interim (4-7 year) 
follow-up were about the same size as what we see from best-practice drug treatment.11
 
 
A more difficult question to answer is why MTO had such pronounced impacts on health.  
Experiments in general tend not to be so well suited to answering “why” questions. In 
MTO the problem is further compounded by the fact that the “treatment” (MTO moves) 
wound up changing a very large number of housing and neighborhood characteristics for 
participating families, as Table 2 makes clear, which complicates any attempt to figure 
out what is responsible for the observed differences in average health outcomes between 
                                                 
10 For example, Success for All, a comprehensive reading intervention that involves extra time for reading, 
ability grouping, frequent assessment, and remediation (including tutoring), has been found to improve 
reading scores for elementary school children and perhaps middle schoolers as well (Borman et al., 2007, 
Chamberlain et al., 2007). Angrist et al. (2011) note that the more effective urban charter schools they 
study in the Boston area tend to be those adopting the “No Excuses” approach of KIPP, which emphasizes 
extra math and reading instruction time. Angrist et al. (2010) shows that those students who benefit the 
most from attending a KIPP school are those with low baseline test scores, or are limited English proficient, 
or are in special education. 
11 Note that while we might have expected improved mental health among MTO adults to translate into 
improved children’s schooling and other outcomes, the size of the impact on children that we would expect 
from improved adult mental health would not be detectable in the MTO data. 
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the treatment and control groups (or the lack of observed differences in other outcome 
domains). So trying to figure out why MTO affected health more than other outcomes 
will necessarily involve some speculation. 
 
With that qualifier in mind, one hypothesis is that the MTO health impacts may be due in 
part – perhaps even in large part – to changes in neighborhood safety. It is easy to see 
why MTO’s impacts on mental health outcomes like the K6 index of psychological 
distress or in our measure of clinical depression might be due to improvements in 
neighborhood safety. An important role for safety in explaining MTO impacts on mental 
health would also be consistent with the fact that three-quarters of MTO adults said safety 
was one of the most important reasons they signed up to move as part of the program.  
 
But safety might also be an important contributing factor to the massive (40 percent) 
impacts of MTO on physical health measures like extreme obesity and diabetes, through 
the effects of safety on stress that previous research has in turn linked to sleep and 
metabolism. One reason to suspect this safety-stress-health link in MTO is by process of 
elimination: we do not see large, consistent MTO impacts on other candidate mechanisms 
around diet, exercise, and access to medical care, though it should be said that our 
measures of these mechanisms are not as detailed as one might ideally wish. Another 
reason is because we can look across MTO demonstration sites and voucher-treatment 
groups and see whether those groups that experience relatively larger changes in a given 
neighborhood characteristic also experience relatively larger changes in health outcomes. 
Using this quasi-experimental dose-response approach, we see that families who have 
relatively larger changes in safety experience relatively larger changes in psychological 
distress, and in diabetes.12
 
 
If safety is an important mechanism behind MTO’s health impacts, then why don’t we 
also see MTO impacts on other outcomes like schooling? After all, Sharkey (2010) finds 
some evidence in the PHDCN data for very large (.5 to .66 standard deviation) short-term 
effects of neighborhood homicide rates on children’s achievement test scores. Perhaps the 
contrast between the PHDCN and MTO data could reflect in part the difference between 
the short-term and long-term effects of exposure to neighborhood crime and violence. 
Over the longer term parents may engage in a variety of protective behaviors that try to 
shield their children from the harmful effects of dangerous neighborhoods, although in 
principle adaptations like this could wind up generating costs in other ways. For example 
in the MTO data when we look across sites and groups using the quasi-experimental 
                                                 
12 This suggestive finding deserves some additional explanation, and some caveats. More technically, we 
use the approach from Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007) and use interactions of indicators for treatment 
group and demonstration sites as instrumental variables for different neighborhood characteristics as 
endogenous explanatory variables. We standardize the neighborhood measures (subtract off the control 
group mean, and divide by the control group standard deviation) so that we can meaningfully compare the 
size of the different coefficients. When we run a model that instruments for a single neighborhood measure 
at a time, the coefficients for the relationship between safety and the K6, or a measure of severe 
psychological distress, or BMI??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
large as what we see when we instrument for tract poverty rate as the endogenous explanatory variable of 
interest. But when we instrument for both safety and tract poverty rate at the same time in the same model, 
we typically cannot statistically distinguish between the effects of the two measures. 
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dose-response model, we see some hints that schooling outcomes for female youth could 
actually be better in more unsafe neighborhoods. One imagines children being kept inside 
more often in dangerous areas and so having more time to do homework, but that is just 
speculation. Understanding more about the safety-schooling link should be an important 
priority for future research. 
 
VI. Implications of MTO for public policy 
 
One way to read the MTO demonstration is as an evaluation of a program (voucher-
assisted residential mobility) that policymakers might consider carrying out at scale. One 
thing we have learned from MTO is that this sort of mobility program can have 
surprisingly large, beneficial impacts on important mental and physical health outcomes.  
Whether these benefits from MTO are large enough to justify the costs of the mobility 
program is difficult to determine with the available data. As Edgar Olsen notes in his 
essay in this volume, the costs to government housing agencies of an MTO-like switch 
from public housing to housing vouchers is likely to be negative – that is, to save money. 
But some of the most important potential costs of MTO are unlikely to show up on any 
government budget spreadsheet. The whole logic behind MTO – that being surrounded 
by relatively more affluent neighbors could be good for the life outcomes of low-income 
families – raises the possibility that MTO moves could have adverse effects on other 
families outside of the MTO demonstration who are living in destination areas or the 
origin neighborhoods that MTO families left. 
 
In principle it could be that mobility programs like MTO are just a zero-sum game, with 
whatever benefits arise to MTO families from living in a lower-poverty area being 
exactly offset by adverse impacts on other families in destination areas from experiencing 
an increase in the poverty rate of their neighborhood. If every family responds the same 
way to living in a neighborhood of a given type, and if the relationship between people’s 
outcomes and neighborhood poverty or other characteristics are linear (so that a 1 
percentage point change in tract poverty or some other neighborhood attribute always has 
the same effect on people’s outcomes, regardless of whether we are moving from 50 to 
49 percent poor area or from 16 to 15 percent) then mobility programs like MTO will 
change the geographic distribution of social problems, but not their overall rates in 
society. MTO is great for studying the effects of MTO moves on the movers, but is not 
well suited to learning anything about these larger society-wide effects. 
 
Even if the health benefits from MTO were sufficient to justify the program’s costs, there 
is still the question of what else we need to do in order to improve those outcome 
domains that were not affected in MTO, particularly schooling and labor market 
outcomes. A common reaction to MTO is to conclude that since MTO-like moves did not 
generate detectably large gains in schooling and labor market outcomes, then more 
intensive mobility interventions are needed. But it is not obvious that such mobility 
programs will necessarily have the effects on schooling and labor market outcomes that 
proponents hope for, or that such policies are even feasible at large scale. 
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One reason I am not sure that more intensive mobility programs will necessarily generate 
big schooling or labor market gains comes from looking at MTO data across sites and 
groups using the quasi-experimental dose-response model described above. This 
approach shows that MTO participants who experience relatively larger changes in 
neighborhood poverty or related characteristics have larger improvements in physical or 
mental health outcomes (Kling, Liebman and Katz, 2007, Ludwig et al., 2011). But we do 
not see the same “dose-response” relationship for schooling or labor market outcomes, 
which means that a larger neighborhood “dose” need not lead to larger changes in 
education or work outcomes. One qualification here is that there is one particular type of 
move – namely, to affluent, mostly-white suburbs – are not very well represented in the 
MTO data. While MTO itself does not have much to say about those sorts of moves, 
follow-up Gautreaux research using longitudinal administrative records has not found 
large beneficial effects from moving to the suburbs (DeLuca et al., 2010). 
 
A different sort of question is whether mobility programs that achieve even more socio-
economic or racial integration than did MTO are feasible at large scale. The standard 
concern has to do with political feasibility, given some of the political opposition that 
arose to MTO itself (Goering, 2003). I do not claim to have any special insight on this 
question of political feasibility, although it is perhaps worth noting that the few programs 
that I know of to have moved poor urban families to affluent suburbs (Gautreaux in 
Chicago, Thompson in Baltimore) were enacted by judges rather than elected politicians. 
 
But there is another important constraint on our ability to achieve even greater levels of 
economic integration than what we saw in MTO, which is the sheer amount of poverty 
itself that we have in the U.S. A common measure of residential segregation is the 
“dissimilarity index,” which is defined as the share of people who would need to be 
moved across census tracts within a given area in order to have the share of poor people 
in each tract equal the share of the larger area that is poor. The five MTO demonstration 
cities have poverty rates right now in the ballpark of 20 percent.13 The average tract 
poverty rate of MTO Experimental group movers (about 21 percent) corresponds 
basically to the benchmark of perfect poverty integration in these MTO cities. Even if we 
implemented a residential-mobility program that would move inner-city families all over 
the country, the poverty rate in the U.S. as a whole right now is 15 percent.14 There is just 
not that much room to achieve more economic integration at large scale when the overall 
poverty rate is on the order of 15 to 20 percent.15
 
 
Another way to read the MTO demonstration is as a way to help inform community-level 
interventions (not just mobility programs), by trying to shed light on the specific 
                                                 
13 Data from the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey for 2006-10 show the poverty rates for the 
five MTO cities equal 21.3 percent for Baltimore, 21.2 percent for Boston, 20.9 percent for Chicago, 19.5 
percent for Los Angeles, and 19.1 percent for Los Angeles. See www.census.gov.  
14 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/14/us/14census.html?pagewanted=all 
15 It is always possible to have some poor families live in tracts with poverty rates below 15%. But since 
15% of the population is poor, that would require some other poor families to then live in tracts with 
poverty rates above 15%. The key point is that if 15% of all Americans are poor, it is simply not possible to 
have each and every poor family live in a tract in which less than 15% of all tract residents are poor. 
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neighborhood attributes that might matter most for people’s life outcomes. If we had all 
the money in the world, the first-best way to learn about community-level interventions is 
to carry out randomized experiments that test community-level interventions. But 
implementing most community-level programs in enough communities to provide 
adequate statistical power to detect effects quickly becomes cost-prohibitive. A second-
best approach for learning about community-level interventions might be to study the 
effects of moving families into different types of communities, as in MTO and in the 
spirit of “mechanism experiments” suggested by Ludwig, Kling and Mullainathan (2011). 
 
While one potential concern is that MTO might have less beneficial impacts on people’s 
lives than would community-level interventions, given the potentially disruptive effects 
of moving itself, this concern strikes me as less serious than it initially appears once we 
recognize the high rates of residential mobility that we see in general in the U.S. 
Typically around 18-22 percent of Americans change addresses each year, about twice 
the rate we see in other developed countries like Japan or Britain (Long, 1992). Mobility 
rates are higher still among American renters, around 32.5 percent per year (Crowley, 
2003). If we implemented a community-level program in a sub-set of neighborhoods, 
after a 10-15 year follow-up period a large share of the original residents would have 
turned over. A large share of the people who currently lived in the new-and-improved 
neighborhood would have moved in from somewhere else. So over the long term MTO 
and a community-level intervention might wind up looking not all that different. 
 
Given my discussion of the MTO results so far, it is probably not surprising that I think 
safety seems like a particularly important target for community-level interventions. The 
MTO families themselves reported on the baseline surveys that safety was far and away 
the most common reason they signed up to participate in MTO. The beneficial effects of 
MTO on neighborhood safety may be one of the key drivers for MTO’s impacts on 
mental health outcomes, and potentially on physical health outcomes like extreme obesity 
and diabetes as well. Improving safety would also have important direct effects on public 
health of low-income populations by reducing the toll of violence. Homicide is the 
leading cause of death to African-Americans 15-24 by far. Homicides, because they are 
so heavily concentrated among young people, are responsible for nearly as many years of 
potential life lost before 65 among blacks as is the nation’s leading overall killer, heart 
disease. Devoting more attention to the crime problem that plagues our inner cities might 
be one of the most helpful things we could do for the low-income families living there. 
 
I am not sure myself why researchers, advocates, philanthropists and policymakers who 
care deeply about improving the lives of poor people don’t take the crime problem more 
seriously. Perhaps one reason might be lingering concern that the cure might be worse 
than the disease. America’s imprisonment rate has increased seven-fold since the 1970s, 
with minorities particularly affected (Western and Pettit, 2010).  
 
But a growing body of evidence has shed light on different ways to prevent criminal 
behavior from occurring in the first place, which can lead to less crime and less 
imprisonment (Cook and Ludwig, 2011). For example, several studies suggest that 
stepped-up policing can deter criminal behavior (Evans and Owens, 1997, Owens, 2011, 
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Zimring, 2012), although doing urban policing in a way that is seen as fair and legitimate 
remains a challenge. Efforts to address deficits among at-risk young people in academic 
skills and non-academic (or “social-cognitive”) skills like self-regulation, conflict 
resolution and future orientation can also prevent criminal behavior (and hence also 
reduce incarceration rates) and improve people’s schooling outcomes at the same time 
(Hill et al., 2011, Lochner, 2011, Heller et al., 2012). 
 
HUD itself could also try get in the game and contribute to crime control through 
community development efforts that try to stimulate and support local “collective 
efficacy” (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls, 1997), or provide young people with 
supervised, productive activities during high-crime periods.16
 
 Given that such a large 
share of HUD’s budget is devoted to housing rather than urban development, efforts to 
improve safety would require putting the “UD” back in “HUD.” 
In sum, I think there are three important lessons that come out of the last 15 years of 
MTO research that were not self-evident when the program started. The first is that the 
William Julius Wilson hypothesis that schooling and employment outcomes are strongly 
affected by the geographic concentration of poverty does not seem to be borne out, at 
least for very disadvantaged families of the sort that signed up for MTO. Second, 
neighborhood environments do seem to have surprisingly large impacts on an outcome 
domain that was not at all the focus of MTO when the demonstration began – health. And 
third, neighborhood safety might be even more important than anyone might have 
initially expected, potentially for health outcomes but certainly for the perceived well-
being of the MTO families themselves. 
 
                                                 
16 I say “supervised” activities because there is some evidence from Jacob and Lefgren (2003) that bringing 
young people together might prevent them from engaging in property crimes, but creates some risk of 
elevated rates of violent behavior just because young people aggregated together might get into arguments 
that turn into fights. 
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Female 0.988 ~ 0.978   
Age as of December 31, 2007 
!"35 0.145   0.132   
36-40 0.212   0.236   
41-45 0.236   0.223   
46-50 0.184   0.203   
> 50 0.223   0.207   
Race and Ethnicity
African-American (any ethnicity) 0.651   0.635   
Other non-white (any ethnicity) 0.281   0.279   
White (any ethnicity) 0.068   0.086   
Hispanic ethnicity (any race) 0.314   0.340   
Other Demographic Characteristics
Never married 0.623   0.624   
Parent before 18 0.249   0.277   
Working 0.271   0.269   
Enrolled in school 0.161   0.174   
High school diploma 0.381   0.347   
GED 0.159 * 0.183   
0.763
  
0.736   
Site
Baltimore 0.134   0.140   
Boston 0.201   0.207   
Chicago 0.205   0.209   
Los Angeles 0.233   0.214   
New York 0.227   0.231   
Neighborhood Characteristics
0.434   0.414   
Streets unsafe at night 0.493   0.517   
Very dissatisfied w/ neighborhood 0.478   0.477   
Lived in neighborhood 5+ years 0.599   0.616   
0.556   0.521   
0.606
Very likely to tell neighbor about child 
getting into trouble 
0.555
0.467
0.199
Receiving Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) 0.763
0.135
0.205
0.205
0.226
0.229
Household member was crime victim in 
last six months
0.416
0.512
0.361
0.234
0.175
0.219
0.664
0.267
0.069
0.304
0.637
0.246
0.245
0.167
0.229
Table 1
Baseline Characteristics
Experimental Voucher Section 8 Voucher Control
N=1456 N=678 N=1139
0.978
0.143
Primary or Secondary Reason for Moving
To get away from gangs and drugs 0.786  0.749   
Better schools for children 0.491   0.553 *
To get a bigger or better apartment 0.441   0.438   
To get a job 0.063   0.050   
Measures: The baseline head of household reported on the neighborhood characteristics listed here. 
0.779
0.481
0.457
0.069
Notes: * = P <.05, ~ = P <.10 on pair wise probability-weighted t-test of the difference between the experimental 
voucher or Section 8 voucher group and the control group. An omnibus F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the 
set of baseline characteristics reported above are the same across MTO sample random assignment groups (p-value for 
the experimental housing voucher vs. control comparison is P =.90; p-value for the Section 8 housing voucher vs. 
control comparison is P =.69). All values represent shares. Shares are calculated using sample weights to account for 
changes in random assignment ratios across randomization cohorts and for subsample interviewing. Sample is adults 
with valid self-reported happiness.
Data source and sample: Adult long-term survey. All adults with who were interviewed.
Table 1, continued
Experimental Voucher Section 8 Voucher Control
ITT TOT ITT TOT N
Number of moves after random assignment 2.165 0.561 * 1.157 * 0.629 * 1.014 * 3273
(0.073) (0.151) (0.096) (0.155)
Tract Poverty at Baseline
Share poor 0.531 -0.004 -0.009 -0.004 -0.007 3227
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009)
Share poor, z-score on U.S. tracts 3.172 -0.034 -0.070 -0.034 -0.054 3227
(0.037) (0.076) (0.046) (0.074)
Share poor, z-score on MTO controls 0.000 -0.027 -0.055 -0.032 -0.051 3220
(0.031) (0.063) (0.038) (0.061)
Tract Poverty 1 Year Post-Random Assignment
Share poor 0.499 -0.170 * -0.351 * -0.140 * -0.224 * 3224
(0.008) (0.016) (0.009) (0.014)
Share poor, z-score on U.S. tracts 2.916 -1.377 * -2.847 * -1.133 * -1.818 * 3224
(0.062) (0.128) (0.072) (0.116)
Share poor, z-score on MTO controls 0.000 -1.053 * -2.170 * -0.873 * -1.386 * 3217
(0.047) (0.097) (0.055) (0.087)
Tract Poverty 5 Years Post-Random Assignment
Share poor 0.399 -0.099 * -0.203 * -0.070 * -0.114 * 3208
(0.007) (0.015) (0.009) (0.015)
Share poor, z-score on U.S. tracts 2.109 -0.803 * -1.646 * -0.571 * -0.921 * 3208
(0.060) (0.124) (0.076) (0.123)
Share poor, z-score on MTO controls 0.000 -0.607 * -1.241 * -0.425 * -0.678 * 3201
(0.045) (0.093) (0.057) (0.091)
Tract Poverty 10-12 Years Post-Random Assignment
Share poor 0.330 -0.045 * -0.093 * -0.040 * -0.065 * 3196
(0.007) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014)
Share poor, z-score on U.S. tracts 1.544 -0.365 * -0.752 * -0.324 * -0.525 * 3196
(0.056) (0.115) (0.071) (0.115)
Share poor, z-score on MTO controls 0.000 -0.285 * -0.587 * -0.248 * -0.398 * 3189
(0.043) (0.088) (0.055) (0.088)
Duration-Weighted Census Tract Characteristics
Share poor 0.396 -0.089 * -0.184 * -0.069 * -0.111 * 3270
(0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011)
Share poor, z-score on U.S. tracts 2.083 -0.722 * -1.487 * -0.556 * -0.897 * 3270
(0.046) (0.094) (0.055) (0.088)
Share poor, z-score on MTO controls 0.000 -0.715 * -1.470 * -0.548 * -0.873 * 3263
(0.045) (0.093) (0.054) (0.086)
Share minority 0.880 -0.061 * -0.125 * -0.018 * -0.029 * 3270
(0.007) (0.014) (0.009) (0.015)
Share minority, z-score on U.S. tracts 1.798 -0.195 * -0.401 * -0.057 * -0.092 * 3270
(0.022) (0.045) (0.029) (0.047)
Share minority, z-score on MTO controls 0.000 -0.377 * -0.774 * -0.115 * -0.183 * 3263
(0.042) (0.086) (0.056) (0.090)
Concentrated Disadv. index 1.390 -0.238 * -0.490 * -0.189 * -0.304 * 3270
(0.016) (0.032) (0.018) (0.029)
Concentrated Disadv. index, z-score on 
MTO controls 0.000 -0.648 * -1.333 * -0.513 * -0.818 * 3263
(0.042) (0.087) (0.050) (0.079)
Share college graduates 0.161 0.042 * 0.087 * 0.018 * 0.029 * 3270
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
Table 2
MTO Effects on Housing and Neighborhood Conditions, 
10-15 Years After Random Assignment
Control 
Mean
Experimental voucher vs. 
Control
Section 8 voucher vs. 
Control
ITT TOT ITT TOT N
Local Area Violent Crime Rate (per 100,000 residents)
Duration-weighted 2419.7 -425.550 * -876.260 * -347.520 * -560.180 * 3269
(44.4) (91.3) (52.8) (85.1)
One year after random assignment 3551.1 -999.020 * ####### * -766.470 * ####### * 3077
(86.2) (187.1) (100.4) (165.4)
Five years after random assignment 2468.1 -448.390 * -960.060 * -274.030 * -455.070 * 3094
(59.6) (127.7) (69.6) (115.6)
Ten years after random assignment 1619.9 -152.270 * -325.110 * -40.660 -66.830 3073
(37.2) (79.4) (56.5) (92.9)
At December 31, 2001 2612.62 -532.990 * ####### * -390.960 * -649.730 * 3057
(68.100) (146.690) (76.700) (127.460)
At May 31, 2008 1447.94 -100.100 * -215.080 * -25.970 -42.600 3053
(34.70) (74.56) (50.51) (82.830)
At baseline 4047.04 -97.840 -202.400 -31.630 -51.260 3165
(91.920) (190.150) (116.860) (189.370)
At final evaluation 1401.40 -85.190 * -180.920 * -82.840 ~ -136.340 ~ 3037
(34.350) (72.960) (43.840) (72.160)
Local Area Property Crime Rate (per 100,000 residents)
Duration-weighted 4928.8 -164.1 -337.9 -267.9 ** -431.2 ** 3268
(109.2) (224.8) (110.5) (177.9)
One year after random assignment 6215.1 -470.1 * -1021.6 * -368.8 * -607.7 * 3080
(250.6) (544.5) (204.9) (337.6)
Five years after random assignment 5094.7 -187.2 -402.0 -54.4 -90.3 3090
(125.7) (269.8) (160.6) (266.7)
Ten years after random assignment 3995.1 -13.6 -29.1 -59.8 -98.3 3083
(101.6) (217.1) (132.2) (217.3)
At December 31, 2001 5151.31 -248.840 * -536.350 * -294.690 * -489.650 * 3056
(118.430) (255.270) (143.620) (238.640)
At May 31, 2008 3626.20 45.340  97.160  61.140  99.990  3078
(82.16) (176.05) (122.19) (199.840)
At baseline 6849.97 193.880  401.070  106.630  172.790  3165
(239.930) (496.330) (224.420) (363.690)
At final evaluation 3542.42 1.670  3.550  -112.020  -183.500  3065
(82.510) (175.220) (100.860) (165.230)
Housing Self-Reports and Interviewer Observations from Long-Term Survey
Condition excellent 0.213 0.003  0.006  0.030  0.048  3267
(0.018) (0.037) (0.024) (0.038)
Condition excellent or good 0.570 0.053 * 0.109 * 0.031 * 0.050 * 3267
(0.021) (0.044) (0.029) (0.046)
Number of housing problems (0-7) 0.836 -0.169 * -0.347 * -0.181 * -0.290 * 3267
(0.059) (0.121) (0.071) (0.114)
0.000 -0.118 * -0.242 * -0.122 * -0.195 * 3264
(0.040) (0.083) (0.049) (0.078)
0.836 0.021  0.044  0.036  0.057  3199
(0.016) (0.032) (0.020) (0.033)
0.348 0.024  0.049  0.007  0.011  3199
(0.021) (0.044) (0.028) (0.045)
0.316 -0.018  -0.037  -0.004  -0.007  3207
(0.011) (0.022) (0.014) (0.022)
0.000 -0.075 ~ -0.156 ~ -0.026 ~ -0.041 ~ 3200
(0.043) (0.089) (0.056) (0.088)
Interviewer observation of neighborhood 
Interviewer observation of neighborhood 
Interviewer rated building condition on 
Table 2, continued
Control 
Mean
Experimental voucher vs. 
Control
Section 8 voucher vs. 
Control
Number of housing problems, z-score
Interviewer rated building condition on 
ITT TOT ITT TOT N
Housing Self-Reports and Interviewer Observations from Long-Term Survey (continued)
0.620 0.026  0.054  0.045  0.072  3273
(0.021) (0.043) (0.027) (0.044)
$678.73 19.500  39.665  -6.261  -10.004  3180
(23.30) (47.38) (30.73) (49.10)
0.676 0.011  0.022  0.020  0.032  3169
(0.020) (0.041) (0.027) (0.043)
0.426 -0.004  -0.007  0.017  0.027  3169
(0.021) (0.043) (0.029) (0.046)
Collective Efficacy: Very Likely/Likely to Report
Kids spraying graffiti 0.589 0.076 * 0.156 * 0.042 * 0.067 * 3255
(0.021) (0.043) (0.028) (0.045)
Kids skipping school 0.346 0.029  0.059  0.075  0.119  3250
(0.021) (0.043) (0.028) (0.045)
Social Networks
1+ friend with college degree 0.532 0.071 * 0.145 * 0.007 * 0.010 * 3203
(0.021) (0.044) (0.029) (0.046)
No close friends 0.145 -0.018  -0.038  0.042  0.066  3265
(0.015) (0.030) (0.022) (0.034)
Medical Care
Place to go for routine care (not ER) 0.935 -0.012  -0.024  0.010  0.015  3264
(0.011) (0.022) (0.012) (0.020)
Safety
Feel unsafe during day, z-score 0.000 -0.089 * -0.183 * -0.115 * -0.184 * 3259
(0.041) (0.085) (0.054) (0.086)
Feel unsafe during day 0.196 -0.036 * -0.074 * -0.045 * -0.072 * 3262
(0.016) (0.034) (0.021) (0.034)
Feel unsafe during night, z-score 0.000 -0.084 * -0.174 * -0.151 * -0.240 * 3243
(0.042) (0.087) (0.056) (0.088)
Feel unsafe during night 0.404 -0.043 * -0.088 * -0.073 * -0.117 * 3246
(0.021) (0.043) (0.027) (0.043)
Police don't respond 0.420 -0.067 * -0.138 * -0.075 * -0.118 * 3146
(0.021) (0.044) (0.028) (0.045)
Saw drugs used/sold last 30 days 0.310 -0.062 * -0.128 * -0.057 * -0.090 * 3249
(0.019) (0.039) (0.025) (0.040)
Household Crime Victimization (Last 6 Months)
Any crime 0.184 -0.022  -0.046  0.025  0.040  3241
(0.016) (0.033) (0.022) (0.035)
Assault 0.074 -0.014  -0.030  -0.005  -0.008  3238
(0.011) (0.022) (0.014) (0.023)
Break-in/attempted break-in 0.043 -0.003  -0.007  0.015  0.025  3242
(0.009) (0.019) (0.013) (0.021)
Snatched purse/wallet/jewelry 0.077 -0.005  -0.010  0.008  0.012  3234
(0.011) (0.023) (0.014) (0.023)
Stabbing/shooting 0.029 -0.006  -0.013  -0.008  -0.013  3241
(0.007) (0.015) (0.008) (0.013)
Threatened with knife/gun 0.066 -0.008  -0.016  0.001  0.001  3236
(0.010) (0.021) (0.013) (0.021)
Received any housing assistance
Total monthly housing cost
Household is rent-burdened
Household is severely rent-burdened
Table 2, continued
Control 
Mean
Experimental voucher vs. 
Control
Section 8 voucher vs. 
Control
Model:  Experimental voucher and Section 8 voucher impacts were estimated jointly using an OLS regression model 
controlling for baseline covariates and field release, weighted, and clustering on family.
Data source and sample:  Adult long-term survey.  All adults who were interviewed.
Measures: Housing problems include peeling paint, broken plumbing, rats, roaches, broken locks, broken windows, and 
broken heating system. Interviewer-observed neighborhood problems include abandoned buildings, cigarette or cigar butts on 
the sidewalk/gutter, "For Sale" signs, metal bars on windows above the basement level, fair or poor street conditions, and 
moderate to heavy amount of litter on the streets. Households are defined as "rent-burdened" if their monthly housing costs 
are greater than or equal to 30% of their monthly household income. A household is "severely rent-burdened" if monthly 
housing costs are greater than or equal to 50% of their monthly household income. The concentrated disadvantage index is a 
weighted combination of census tract percent [i] poverty, [ii] on welfare, [iii] unemployed, [iv] female-headed family 
households, and [v] under age 18, with loading factors developed using 2000 Census tracts in Chicago by Sampson, Sharkey, 
and Raudenbush (2008), but does not include percent African-American.
Table 2, continued
Notes: * = P <.05, ~ = P <.10 on two-tailed t-test. Robust standard errors shown in parentheses.  ITT = Intent-to-Treat or 
estimated impact of being offered an MTO housing voucher; TOT = Treatment-on-Treated or estimated impact of moving 
using an MTO housing voucher. The control mean is unadjusted.  
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